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It is widely believed that people in low-
and middle-income countries (LMICs) are
in poor health because they cannot reach
medical services on time. Predicated on this
belief, much of global health policy focuses
on the physical provision of goods (clinics,
equipment, and medicine) and getting
doctors to ‘‘underserved’’ rural areas. Yet,
recentevidenceshowshighutilizationrates,
even among the poor [1,2].
While problems of access are certainly
salient for particular disadvantaged popu-
lations, quality is likely the constraining
factor for the majority.
The excellent systematic review in this
week’s PLoS Medicine by Paul Garner and
colleagues [3] focuses discussion on this
critical issue. Their finding of poor quality
in both the public and private sectors
along different dimensions (competence is
similar in both, but the private sector is
more patient centered) brings much need-
ed evidence to an ongoing debate. The
review reflects a logical initial focus in the
literature on individual providers rather
than the interactions between providers;
going forward, broadening the discussion
on quality to health care markets can
generate valuable insights for policy.
The Context: Health Care
Markets in LMICs Are Incredibly
Complex
Typically, households can access multi-
ple providers, ranging from fully qualified
public and private sector providers to
those without any formal medical training
in the private sector. In Delhi, India’s
capital, there are 70 doctors, most in the
private sector, within a 15-minute walk of
every household. In the private sector,
about half are fully qualified and 10%–
15% have no medical training, with a
higher fraction of qualified providers in
richer neighborhoods [4].
According to a recent report, across
rural India, the average household can
access 3.2 private, 0.3 public, and 2.3
public paramedical staff within their
village [5]. In rural Madhya Pradesh—
one of the poorest states in India—
households can access 7.5 private provid-
ers, 0.6 public providers, and 3.04 public
paramedical staff. Of those identified as
doctors, 65% had no formal medical
training and, of every 100 visits to health
care providers, eight were to the public
sector and 70 to untrained private sector
providers.
Consequently, there is enormous varia-
tion in practice-quality within villages and
neighborhoods. This variation in quality
has implications for a variety of policy
decisions ranging from standardization
and regulation to medical training. Three
steps can help bring evidence to bear on
policy discussions.
Step 1: Documenting
Practice-Quality Variation
Providers in the informal sector provide
a significant fraction of care in many
countries. Yet the review by Garner and
colleagues could locate only two studies on
quality in the informal sector from any
LMIC, both of which were subsequently
excluded from the review due to limited
data. Speculation that the quality of care
must be poor among providers in the
informal sector is not backed up by
comparative evidence with quality in other
sectors. As the review points out, the
relevant question is: ‘‘Quality in the
private sector is poor, but compared to
what?’’ Results from Delhi show that low
effort reduces the quality of care in the
public sector to the level of untrained
providers in the private sector [6]. Data on
the relative quality of different types of
providers could help explain the large
market share of informal sector providers
and illuminate the trade-off between
access and quality with such providers in
the market.
Step 2: Understanding Provider
Behavior
What are the implications of practice-
quality variation and competition in the
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Linked Research Article
This Perspective discusses the fol-
lowing new study published in PLoS
Medicine:
Berendes S, Heywood P, Oliver S,
Garner P (2011) Quality of Private and
Public Ambulatory Health Care in
Low and Middle Income Countries:
Systematic Review of Comparative
Studies. PLoS Med 8(4): e1000433.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000433.
Paul Garner and colleagues con-
ducted a systematic review of 80
studies to compare the quality of
private versus public ambulatory
health care in low and middle
income countries.
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and how do different components of
quality—competence and effort—relate
to each other? Recent research documents
a large gap between medical knowledge
and practice: doctors, in countries ranging
from Tanzania to India to The Nether-
lands, do a lot less with real patients than
they say they would in similar hypothetical
scenarios (vignettes) [7–9]. This ‘‘know–
do’’ gap responds to incentives: it is higher
in the public sector where fixed salaries
provide poor incentives to exert effort.
But, there is also a large know–do gap in
the private sector where doctors have full
incentives to provide effort.
Because of the know–do gap, medical
training has a small impact on the actual
care a patient receives; interventions that
can induce higher effort have a very high
payoff. But what these interventions may
be depends on the underlying explanation
of the know–do gap—something we know
little about.
If this gap reflects shortages in the
health care market so that doctors ‘‘ra-
tion’’ care to cater to more patients, lower
per-patient effort could be consistent with
higher patient welfare. But ‘‘rationed’’
care cannot be the entire explanation. In
Tanzania, many doctors see five patients
in a day—and then spend 3 minutes on
each. Consequently, there is no relation-
ship between patient load and quality in
the public sector [10]. When researchers
sit with doctors, effort immediately in-
creases, leading to improvements in qual-
ity and patient satisfaction [11]. Why
doesn’t competition lead to higher effort
and better care in markets with many
health care providers?
Step 3: Moving from Provider to
Market Quality
The third step translates provider qual-
ity to market quality. The core issue here is
how practice-quality variation impacts
patient outcomes. For instance, the impact
of poor quality providers on the market for
health care will depend on the extent to
which their assessments contradict and
confuse accurate diagnoses received from
better trained physicians. This in turn
depends on the confidence that patients
place in different doctors.
When provider quality is known, a
market with one excellent and one low
quality provider may be better than a
market with two average providers, be-
cause quality differences will be priced into
the cost of services. Patients may visit the
more expensive, but excellent, doctor for
diagnosis and the poor, but low cost,
provider for routine tasks. If provider
quality is unknown, the (correct) diagnosis
by the excellent doctor may contradict a
second (but wrong) diagnosis from the
poor quality provider, without any guid-
ance for the patient on which diagnosis is
likely correct.
In general, quality in the health care
market differs from the quality of individual
providers, and patient knowledge of provid-
er quality mediates this difference. To
what extent patients are ignorant of doctor
quality is an empirically testable hypoth-
esis; preliminary results from ongoing
research in Delhi suggest that household
assessments of provider quality match up
fairly well with quality assessed through
independent medical vignettes. How to
aggregate provider to market-level quality
is a conceptually and empirically open
question.
What Next?
The paper by Garner and colleagues is
a wake-up call for the global health
community; the review could identify only
80 studies on quality of care across
LMICs. Understanding health care in
these contexts requires building on such
provider-level data to construct market-
level aggregates. Such market-level analy-
sis can help answer policy questions
ranging from regulatory issues to the
trade-off between access and quality.
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